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DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE:  FRAMING, INTUITION, 
AND JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING OF 
FORENSIC FEATURE-COMPARISON 
METHODS EVIDENCE 
Jane Campbell Moriarty* 
 
Without appropriate estimates of accuracy, an examiner’s statement that 
two samples are similar—or even indistinguishable—is scientifically 
meaningless:  it has no probative value, and considerable potential for 
prejudicial impact.  Nothing—not training, personal experience nor 
professional practices—can substitute for adequate empirical 
demonstration of accuracy.1 
INTRODUCTION 
During the Symposium for the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules, held at Boston College on October 27, 2017, the 
scientists, statisticians, legal academics, and criminal defense lawyers 
presented a unified theme:  the federal courts have not fulfilled their role as 
gatekeepers to exclude or limit potentially unreliable feature-comparison 
methods of forensic science evidence (“FCM evidence”).2  The only voiced 
 
*  Carol Los Mansmann Chair in Faculty Scholarship and Professor, Duquesne University 
School of Law.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, 
Daubert, and Rule 702, held on October 27, 2017, at Boston College School of Law.  The 
Symposium took place under the sponsorship of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules.  For an overview of the Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:  
Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 
(2018).  Many thanks to Professor Capra for inviting me to speak at the Boston College Law 
School Symposium and to write for this Fordham Law Review Symposium.  Additional thanks 
to the patient and thoughtful editors of the Fordham Law Review; to Richard Bielawa for his 
fine research assistance; and to Lauren Gailey for her kind recommendation and friendship.  
Finally, thanks to my colleague Bruce Ledewitz for our frequent chats that sharpen the 
questions and provide insights to the answers.  I’m so grateful for the friendship and 
collegiality. 
 
 1. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:  ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 46 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
R76Y-7VU] (emphasis omitted). 
 2. These types of forensic-science evidence, which compare a known and unknown 
sample, include handwriting, shoe print, microscopic hairs, fingerprint, and bite marks, among 
other forms of evidence.  DNA is a type of FCM evidence but is methodologically distinct 
from these others forms and is not addressed in this Article.  FCM evidence has frequently 
been referred to as “individualization evidence.” See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Individualization 
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dissents came from the DOJ and FBI lawyers, who argued that the courts had 
been admitting such pattern-matching evidence properly and that the 
evidence was indeed reliable.3 
For decades, scientists and legal academics have been highly critical of 
claims that FCM evidence has a reliable foundation and can reliably match a 
known and unknown sample.4  Moreover, as Innocence Project data and 
analysis of such data establish, wrongful convictions often include erroneous 
FCM evidence.5 
Two national committees have written reports about the shortcomings of 
forensic science:  The National Research Council for the National Academy 
of Sciences report in 2009 (“NRC report”) and the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology report in 2016 (“PCAST report”).6  The 
 
Is Dead, Long Live Individualization!  Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint 
Analysis in the United States, 13 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 117, 119–22 (2014) (discussing the 
history of the term “individualization” and the problems it poses); Jane Campbell Moriarty, 
Will History Be Servitude?:  The NAS Report on Forensic Science and the Role of the 
Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 300; see also David H. Kaye, Identification, 
Individualization and Uniqueness:  What’s the Difference, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 85, 85–
94 (2009). 
 3. See Symposium, Forensic Evidence, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1459 (2018). 
 4. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  A PATH FORWARD 87 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ]; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON 
SCI. & TECH., supra note 1; Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero:  Accounting for Error in Latent 
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005); Itiel E. Dror & David 
Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 (2006); Brandon L. 
Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”:  The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1993); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science:  
The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007); Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001); Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Scripting Expertise:  The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the 
Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001); Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., 
The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725 (2011); Jane 
Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 
1 (2007); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science:  Grand Goals, Tragic 
Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2005, at 16; Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) 
Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability:  Are Criminal 
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000); D. Michael 
Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:  The Lessons of 
Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise,’ 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989); D. Michael Risinger 
with Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts:  Daubert Meets Handwriting 
Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, 
Failed Forensics:  How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2008); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm 
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005); Adam B. Shniderman, 
Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Reform:  More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126 
YALE L.J. FORUM 348 (2017). 
 5. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, at 14 (explaining that 82 percent of the 137 
exonerees’ cases they reviewed involved “invalid forensic science testimony”). 
 6. Other national bodies conduct research, collect data, and issue publications about 
various aspects of forensic science, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
and the National Commission on Forensic Science. See Forensic Science, NIST, 
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NRC report concluded that, other than DNA analysis, “no forensic method 
has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a 
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source.”7  The PCAST report was even more pointed 
in its critique, finding shortcomings in virtually all aspects of FCM evidence, 
from foundation through application.8 
Despite the disturbing criticism of FCM evidence and its association with 
wrongful convictions, courts have been generally unwilling to exclude or 
even limit experts’ conclusions about such evidence—a point made 
repeatedly by the speakers at the conference and in the NRC report.9  Even 
more curiously, courts are much more willing to exclude scientific evidence 
in civil cases when such evidence is challenged under a reliability standard.10  
So what explains the intransigence of the judiciary refusing to take seriously 
the critiques of FCM evidence? 
While there are many explanations for this persistent refusal to recognize 
the shortcomings of FCM evidence,11 one idea I suggested in 2010 still 
resonates:  courts do not appreciate the complexity of FCM evidence and, 
believing pattern matching is a straightforward and uncomplicated endeavor, 
admit the evidence under the assumption that cross-examination can reveal 
its problematic shortcomings.12  FCM evidence is deceptive in its apparent 
simplicity—something courts do not recognize.  In fact, rather than requiring 
the prosecution to meet the standard of reliability of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.13 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702,14 courts have 
employed different ways of sidestepping a detailed reliability analysis, with 
some simply latching onto Daubert’s comment that “[v]igorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 
 
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science [https://perma.cc/5RHV-Q4YE] (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2018); National Commission on Forensic Science, NIST, 
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/national-commission-forensic-science 
[https://perma.cc/32RK-QA4T] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 7. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 7. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 11 (“[T]he vast majority of the reported 
opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial judges rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony 
offered by prosecutors:  most reported opinions also indicate that the appellate courts routinely 
deny appeals contesting trial court decisions admitting forensic evidence against criminal 
defendants.”). 
 10. See Moriarty, supra note 2, at 308–09. 
 11. See, e.g., Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science 
Problem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1555–59 (2017) (discussing multiple reasons for judicial 
resistance to properly gatekeep forensic science); Shniderman, supra note 4, at 352–54 (listing 
various reasons, including a lack of scientific aptitude, a “systemic pro-prosecution bias on the 
bench,” and the desire for reelection by proclaiming oneself tough on crime); see also United 
States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 
2d 549, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (recognizing the shortcomings of fingerprint comparison but 
allowing it into evidence because to do otherwise would “make the best the enemy of the 
good”). 
 12. Moriarty, supra note 2, at 319 (suggesting that “[i]t may well be that fingerprint, 
handwriting, and microscopic hair comparisons seem to be ‘simple’ problems for judges”). 
 13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 14. See infra Part II (discussing these standards). 
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burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky 
but admissible evidence.”15 
This Article explains how courts have skirted the reliability problem of 
FCM evidence and argues that judges perceive the question of FCM evidence 
to be a simple problem that cross-examination can solve.  Relying on insights 
from cognitive science to help explain the resistance of the courts to FCM 
evidence challenges, the Article urges courts to recognize the complexity of 
FCM evidence and refocus on the danger such evidence poses for continued 
wrongful conviction.  By framing the admissibility of FCM evidence as an 
“easy” question, courts are relying on heuristics—that is, shortcuts—to solve 
complex problems.  As this Article explains, using heuristics can lead to more 
error-prone decisions, as such shortcuts are vulnerable to various cognitive 
biases and systemic fallacies.  In both reasoning and language, courts exhibit 
biased-affected decision-making. 
Part I of the Article briefly reviews the NRC report and the PCAST report 
while Part II discusses cases addressing FCM evidence.  The cognitive 
science that may explain the courts’ consistent approaches to the evidence is 
considered in Part III.  Part III then applies these concepts to judicial 
decision-making related to FCM evidence—a complicated problem in need 
of greater analysis. 
I.  THE NRC AND PCAST REPORTS 
Following a three-year congressionally mandated study of forensic 
science,16 the National Academy of Sciences issued the groundbreaking NRC 
report.17  The NRC report concluded that, except for DNA analysis, no 
forensic method “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently and with a high degree of certainty support conclusions about . . . 
‘matching’ of an unknown item of evidence to a specific known source.”18  
Strong words from a body as well regarded as the National Academy of 
Sciences, a nonpartisan organization that has addressed major science-related 
issues for more than 150 years.19 
The NRC report described the use of forensic-science evidence in the 
courtroom, recognizing both the shortcomings of current methods and the 
need for improvement in the forensic sciences.20  The NRC report found that 
the “existing legal regime,” which included trial and appellate standards, 
judges, and lawyers who lacked scientific expertise, was “inadequate to the 
 
 15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
 16. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 1, at 22 
(describing the genesis of the NRC report). 
 17. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4. 
 18. Id. at 87. 
 19. For a fuller understanding of the significant role that the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine have played in addressing pressing issues, see its website 
at The National Academies:  An Overview, NAT’L ACADS. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/brochure/index.html [https://perma.cc/6ZU4-NZ5L] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 20. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 85–86. 
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task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science disciplines.”21  In 
the chapter detailing the shortcomings of forensic science as courtroom 
evidence, the report addresses the courts’ role in managing poor-quality 
forensic science: 
“[T]he undeniable reality is that the community of forensic science 
professionals has not done nearly as much as it reasonably could have done 
to establish either the validity of its approach or the accuracy of its 
practitioners’ conclusions,” and the courts have been “utterly ineffective” 
in addressing this problem.22 
The report also found that courts were not successfully applying the Daubert 
reliability standard,23 noting with irony that appellate courts were more 
willing to second-guess trial court decisions about expert evidence in civil 
cases than they were decisions in criminal matters.24 
The initial reaction to the NRC report seemed encouraging, with the U.S. 
Supreme Court even commenting on it in a case involving the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  The Court mentioned the problems of 
subjectivity, bias, and the unreliability of feature-comparison evidence, 
specifically mentioning fingerprints, pattern-impression analysis, toolmarks, 
and firearms.25  Law schools held conferences and published symposia 
articles about the perceived importance of the NRC report and its 
implications for courtroom evidence.26  Many, including this author,27 hoped 
that the NRC report would spur courts to reevaluate the way they were 
treating FCM evidence.28 
However, despite the publication of the NRC report, “courts largely 
ignored the report’s findings and continued to allow forensic scientists, 
particularly in the pattern-impression disciplines, to testify to 
individualization statements without a scientific basis for the statements.”29  
A handful of courts limited the conclusions of the experts,30 but most courts 
 
 21. Id. at 85. 
 22. Id. at 108–09 (alteration in original) (first quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity 
of Latent Fingerprint Identification:  Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 134 (2008); then quoting Neufeld, supra note 4, at S109). 
 23. See infra Part II (explaining this standard further). 
 24. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 11. 
 25. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 (2009). 
 26. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report:  A Literature 
Review, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 380–81 nn.24–29 (2012) (listing the conferences, written 
symposia, and articles published at the time). 
 27. Moriarty, supra note 2, at 325–26 (suggesting that if the Supreme Court held lower 
courts accountable for forensic-science evidence gatekeeping, it would spur the judiciary to 
evaluate the testimony more accurately). 
 28. Giannelli, supra note 26, at 378 (collecting scholarly descriptions of the NRC report 
calling it “a ‘blockbuster, a watershed, a scathing critique, a milestone, and pioneering’”). 
 29. Jennifer Friedman & Jessica Brand, It Is Now up to the Courts:  “Forensic Science in 
Criminal Courts:  Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods,” 57 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 367, 371–72 (2017). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2010) (limiting 
the degree of certainty that the expert could give about a match); United States v. Taylor, 663 
F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009); United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574–75 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that permitting the expert to testify to a “reasonable degree of 
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continued to admit the evidence as they always had.  Some courts avoided 
the NRC report by suggesting that it was not intended for use in the 
courtroom.31  Others have sidestepped the NRC report by discussing the long 
history of admitting such evidence.32  Some courts proudly “remain[] faithful 
to their tradition” of admitting the evidence.33  A number of courts categorize 
the evidence as not particularly scientific and therefore do not really employ 
Daubert’s reliability analysis,34 and several judges have simply referenced 
the opinions of other courts that analyzed such evidence and found it 
sufficiently reliable.35  Some decisions patently ignore the NRC report, 
 
ballistic certainty” would be seriously misleading and limiting the opinion of the expert to 
ballistics match testimony to a statement of “more likely than not”).  Professor Imwinkelried 
sees a “definite judicial trend” to prohibit experts from testifying to overstated claims of 
certainty. Edward Imwinkelried, The Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing 
Miscarriages of Justice:  Intellectual Honesty About the Uncertainty of Measurement in 
Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 333, 352 (2014). 
 31. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 59 (Mass. 2010) (“The NAS 
Report does not conclude that fingerprint evidence is so unreliable that courts should no longer 
admit it.”); see also Allen v. United States, No. 4:07CV00027 ERW, 2011 WL 13182909, at 
*3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (“The NAS Report, at most, calls into question whether the 
techniques used by ballistics and fingerprint experts to generate their conclusions can be 
counted on, in all circumstances, to produce totally reliable, unequivocal findings.  It does not 
indicate that the conclusions of the experts in this case were wrong; the NAS Report does not 
suggest that the recovered bullets were not actually discharged from the firearm associated 
with Movant, or that the fingerprint matched to Movant was not actually Movant’s.”); United 
States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (D. Md. 2009) (claiming, inaccurately, that the co-
chair of the NRC report “made it clear that nothing in the [r]eport was intended to answer the 
‘question whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under applicable law’”); 
Moriarty, supra note 2, at 322 (discussing this inaccuracy).  
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hile we 
must agree . . . that this record does not show the technique has been subject to testing that 
would meet all of the standards of science, it would be unrealistic in the extreme for us to 
ignore the countervailing evidence.  Fingerprint identification has been used extensively by 
law enforcement agencies all over the world for almost a century.”); Meskimen v. 
Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 526, 535 (Ky. 2013) (“In this case, the Commonwealth offered 
evidence that has been admissible in the state of Kentucky for many years.  Microscopic hair 
analysis is a scientifically reliable method, and we, therefore, do not require that a Daubert 
hearing be held with regard to the admittance of such evidence.”); State v. Pigott, 325 P.3d 
247, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (“The reliability of fingerprint identification has been tested 
in our adversarial system for over a century and routinely subjected to peer review.”); 
Moriarty, supra note 2, at 304 (discussing the “long history of use” fallacy in many cases). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Casey, 928 F. Supp. 2d 397, 400 (D.P.R. 2013) (stating that 
“the Court . . . remains faithful to the long-standing tradition of allowing the unfettered 
testimony of qualified ballistics experts”). 
 34. See, e.g., Gambora, 933 N.E.2d at 60 (noting that the issues highlighted in the NRC 
report are “important and deserve consideration” but declining to take such consideration 
because of the “plausible” proposition that examiners can compare two prints and determine 
that they came from the same source); see also United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 636, 
571 (D. Md. 2010) (noting that “it may be debatable” whether firearms-related toolmark 
identification evidence is “science” but that it is “clearly technical or specialized” with a 
“baseline level of credibility”). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“This 
court too ‘sees no need to duplicate the considerable efforts of those courts.’” (quoting United 
States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL 5989813, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012)); 
id. at 249 (“[G]iven the extensive record presented in other cases, the court joins in precluding 
this expert witness from testifying that he is ‘certain’ or ‘100%’ sure of his conclusions that 
certain items match.”); United States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL 5989813, at 
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despite it being raised in the case.36  And some jurists use a combination of 
ways to avoid the implications of the NRC report.  As Professor Paul 
Giannelli recently concluded when reviewing the cases, “[d]espite the [NRC] 
report, courts generally continued to admit the same evidence.”37 
Although the NRC report explained how the forensic science specialties 
lacked empirical data to support the claims that analysts made in court and 
provided recommendations for both developing protocols and pursuing 
research to improve the specialties, little progress was made to improve those 
specialties.38  Given the courts’ repeated willingness to look past the 
shortcomings of the evidence, there was little incentive to improve the quality 
of what was presented in court. 
In April 2009, President Barack Obama announced the President’s Council 
of Advisors on Science and Technology.39  In 2015, the President tasked 
PCAST with determining “whether there are additional steps on the scientific 
side, beyond those already taken by the Administration in the aftermath of a 
highly critical [NRC Report] on the state of the forensic sciences, that could 
help ensure the validity of forensic evidence used in the Nation’s legal 
system.”40 
Over the course of a year, PCAST compiled and reviewed voluminous 
material and studies, and in 2016 it issued the PCAST report.41  The PCAST 
report focused on “defining the validity and reliability of one specific area 
within forensic science:  forensic feature-comparison methods.”42  These 
methods fit within the field of “metrology—the science of measurement and 
its application.”43  The authors described the two different types of feature 
comparison methods, objective and subjective, discussed the scientific 
 
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (“This Court . . . sees no need to hold a separate Daubert hearing.  
This Court has reviewed [other] opinions . . . and is persuaded by those thorough and well-
reasoned decisions that ballistics testimony of the sort proffered in this case is admissible 
under Daubert.  This Court sees no need to duplicate the considerable efforts of those courts.”); 
United States v. Stone, 848 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“[T]his Court finds no 
basis to expand on, or depart from, the holdings of numerous courts that latent fingerprint 
identification evidence is reliable under the five-factor test developed by the Supreme Court 
in Daubert.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 146 A.3d 496, 502–03 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) 
(ignoring the NRC report issue raised by the defendant but noting that toolmark identification 
is generally accepted within the scientific community), cert. denied, 155 A.3d 443 (Md. 2017). 
 37. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science:  Daubert’s Failure, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3031227 [https://perma.cc/N32H-VL36]. 
 38. Friedman & Brand, supra note 29, at 368. 
 39. About PCAST, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/ 
eop/ostp/pcast/about [https://perma.cc/6RLC-X8D2] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 40. Eric Lander et al., PCAST Releases Report on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts, 
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/20/ 
pcast-releases-report-forensic-science-criminal-courts [https://perma.cc/4GMJ-WHSQ]. 
 41. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 1. 
 42. Id. at 44. 
 43. Id.  Forensic feature-comparison methods involve a determination of whether “two 
sets of features agree within a given measurement tolerance.” Id. at 44 n.93. 
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criteria for both foundational validity and validity as applied, and then 
addressed the views of the forensic-science community.44 
The PCAST report is clear in its recommendation about what is necessary 
to establish validity of forensic feature-comparison methods: 
 Scientific validity and reliability require that a method has been 
subjected to empirical testing, under conditions appropriate to its intended 
use, that provides valid estimates of how often the method reaches an 
incorrect conclusion.  For subjective feature-comparison methods, 
appropriately designed black-box studies are required, in which many 
examiners render decisions about many independent tests (typically, 
involving “questioned” samples and one or more “known” samples) and 
the error rates are determined.  Without appropriate estimates of accuracy, 
an examiner’s statement that two samples are similar—or even 
indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless:  it has no probative value, 
and considerable potential for prejudicial impact.  Nothing—not training, 
personal experience nor professional practices—can substitute for adequate 
empirical demonstration of accuracy.45 
The PCAST report indicates that methods must be empirically tested in an 
appropriate fashion to make sure they are accurate:  “Without an appropriate 
estimate of its accuracy [using appropriate empirical testing], a metrological 
method is useless—because one has no idea how to interpret its results.”46  
The PCAST report also included a number of recommendations for various 
bodies, including one directed at the judiciary:  “When deciding the 
admissibility of expert testimony, Federal judges should take into account the 
appropriate scientific criteria for assessing scientific validity.”47 
II.  JUDICIAL DECISIONS ABOUT FCM EVIDENCE 
Despite robust challenges to FCM evidence over the last three decades, 
courts have rebuffed nearly all claims under a Daubert reliability standard,48 
 
 44. Id. at 44–66. 
 45. Id. at 46 (emphasis omitted).  For further explanations of the PCAST report, see 
Friedman & Brand, supra note 29, at 374–81; Giannelli, supra note 37, at 51–53; David H. 
Kaye, How Daubert and Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistics Evidence and a Few Things 
the Judiciary Could Do About It, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1639, 1651–58 (2018). 
 46. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 1, at 48. 
 47. Id. at 145.  For additional commentary on the PCAST report and its potential 
implications, see 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:  THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 29:11–29:15 (2017); 1 PAUL GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE §§ 1.08(b), 13.04, 14.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2017); 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra, 
§ 16.01.  
 48. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The so-
called Daubert trilogy, composed of the Daubert decision, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire, Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), collectively 
require that all expert testimony be reliable.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has intentionally 
incorporated the requirements of those, and other, cases. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory 
committee’s notes on 2000 amendments (“Rule 702 has been amended in response to 
Daubert . . . and to the many cases applying Daubert . . . .”).  Rule 702 requires the expert to 
be qualified, the testimony to be both specialized and helpful, and proof that “the testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data; . . . is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
[that] the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” FED. 
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a Frye general-acceptance standard,49 and under various other forms of 
challenges, such as newly discovered evidence50 or a claim of constitutional 
infirmity.51  Although the NRC report provided a scientific consensus about 
the shortcomings of FCM evidence, courts have nearly uniformly refused to 
address these shortcomings52 and have found ways to minimize or sidestep 
the importance of the report.53 
 
R. EVID. 702.  Decisions involving interpretations of Daubert with respect to FCM evidence 
are discussed at length infra. 
 49. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013–14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  For cases upholding 
forensic science under a Frye general-acceptance standard, see People v. Luna, 989 N.E.2d 
655, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (concluding that a Frye hearing was not required for fingerprints, 
citing sister courts, and holding that “the trial court properly took judicial notice of the general 
acceptance of the ACE–V methodology within the relevant scientific community”); State v. 
Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (holding no abuse of discretion for admitting 
the fingerprint expert’s testimony without a hearing on general acceptance because of judicial 
precedent and the “longstanding reliance on fingerprint evidence”); State v. Lizarraga, 364 
P.3d 810, 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that there was no error denying a Frye 
hearing and request for limits on expert testimony); State v. Pigott, 325 P.3d 247, 250 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he reliability of fingerprint identification has been tested in our adversarial 
system for over a century and routinely subjected to peer review.  The trial court considered 
all of this in reaching its conclusion that a Frye hearing was not needed.  The trial court 
expressly found that the identification analysis is accepted in the relevant scientific 
community.” (footnote omitted)). 
 50. See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Shifting Scientific Opinion in Forensic 
Identification Evidence and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims in the United States:  The 
Influence of Finality and Legal Process Theory, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 649, 672 (2015) 
(reviewing cases in a variety of areas and discussing the consistent judicial resistance to the 
NRC report as a form of newly discovered evidence and finding that “there is a judicial 
resistance towards allowing claims that shifting scientific opinion about various forensic 
identification methods . . .  qualify as newly discovered evidence”). 
 51. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, No. 4:07CV00027 ERW, 2011 WL 13182909, at *2–
3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (holding that the NRC report did not suggest that all forensic 
science was of questionable reliability or materially inaccurate for purposes of conviction and 
sentencing, which was the required showing to prevail under the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment); accord United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 
1040–42 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a due process claim about a conviction that rested in part 
on compositional analysis of bullet lead evidence that the FBI stopped using due its 
unreliability); Rice v. Gavin, No. 15-291, 2016 WL 3009392, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2016 
(holding that the defendant’s claim that the NRC report undermined the integrity of the bullet 
comparison evidence was meritless and did not constitute a due process violation). 
 52. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent:  The Impact of 
the National Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic Science 
Evidence in the United States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 585, 613 (2015) (“[B]y and large, 
[the NRC report] has not been received as a scientific statement requiring engagement, let 
alone deference or alignment, by most judges.”); Kaye, supra note 45, at 1640 (“The years 
that followed [the publication of the NRC report] proved frustrating to those who had hoped 
that the courts would demand the scientific proof of validity and accuracy that the committee 
found absent in some areas as a condition for admissibility.”). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 14–cr–00412–TEH, 2015 WL 5012949, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (noting that the NRC report “has been considered and rejected as a 
basis for excluding ballistics evidence by numerous courts”); United States v. Otero, 849 F. 
Supp. 2d 425, 438 (D.N.J. 2012) (mentioning concerns raised by the NRC report but rejecting 
them as undermining the reliability of the evidence and stating that “the district court must 
conduct a flexible reliability analysis and leave questions about the strength of evidence to the 
jury”); Gee v. United States, 54 A.3d 1249, 1266–68 (D.C. 2012) (holding no abuse of 
discretion where the lower court concluded that the NRC report was not a “learned treatise” 
under FRE 803(18)); People v. Luna, 989 N.E.2d 655, 674–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing 
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Many opinions do not analyze the Daubert factors54 in depth.  In fact, the 
majority of opinions have avoided any serious analysis of the factors or have 
merely given lip service to the factors by concluding the test has been met, 
despite the Advisory Committee’s admonishment that “testing” means an 
objective rather than a “subjective, conclusory approach that cannot be 
assessed for reliability.”55  As Professor David Kaye concludes, courts alter 
and misapply the factors and shy “away from scrutinizing criminalistics 
evidence of identity as Daubert originally seemed to require.”56  More 
typically, when the evidence—even with references to the NRC report—is 
challenged, the courts have cited prior case law,57 looked to the decisions of 
sister courts,58 focused on the experience of the experts, claimed the Daubert 
factors are meant to be helpful and not definitive,59 or claimed any concerns 
about reliability were a matter for cross-examination.60 
In 2015, ignoring the NRC report’s critiques, the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Dale61 dismissed arguments that fingerprint and handwriting 
comparisons were potentially unreliable scientific evidence.  The court 
 
cases from several jurisdictions and noting that the “the nuanced report, while critical of 
various aspects of the ACE-V methodology, does not in itself establish a lack of general 
acceptance among the relevant scientific community or otherwise undermine the uniform body 
of precedent rejecting admissibility challenges to print evidence”); Commonwealth v. 
Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 59–60 (Mass. 2010) (“We recognize, however, that the issues 
highlighted in the [NRC] report are important, and deserve consideration.  Nevertheless, we 
do not undertake such consideration in this case.  The [NRC] Report accepts as ‘plausible’ the 
proposition that ‘a careful comparison of two impressions can accurately discern whether or 
not they had a common source.’” (quoting NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 142)). 
 54. As described by the Advisory Committee in the notes to the 2000 amendments, the 
factors include  
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, 
whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether 
it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be 
assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer 
review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or 
theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; 
and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes on 2000 amendments.  Despite this 
interpretation of “tested” to require an objective, rather than subjective, conclusory approach, 
courts have not adopted this interpretation with respect to forensic-science evidence.  The 
“subjectivity of a methodology is not fatal under Rule 702 and Daubert, as ‘a court may admit 
well-founded testimony based on specialized training and experience.’” United States v. 
Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting United States v. Montiero, 407 
F. Supp. 2d 351, 371 (D. Mass. 2006)). 
 55. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes on 2000 amendments. 
 56. Kaye, supra note 45, at 1649. 
 57. See, e.g., Luna, 989 N.E.2d at 667 (noting that courts may take judicial notice of 
general acceptance by looking to “unequivocal and undisputed prior judicial decisions” 
(quoting People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ill. 2007))). 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 679. 
 59. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding the decision 
to admit fingerprints despite concerns whether the evidence met all of the Daubert 
requirements). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Myshawn Bonds, No. 15 CR 573-2, 2017 WL 4511061, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2017). 
 61. 618 F. App’x 494 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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described the arguments as both meritless and foreclosed by 1999 and 2005 
opinions—both of which predated the NRC and PCAST reports.62  The court 
did not mention the Daubert factors or Rule 702’s reliability requirements.  
Rather, without any explanation of why, the court asserted that the experts 
“used scientifically reliable methodology.”63  In United States v. John,64 the 
Fifth Circuit noted that 
absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to 
satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.  “Fingerprint identification has been 
admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at 
least 1911.”  In terms of specific Daubert factors, the reliability of the 
technique has been tested in the adversarial system for over a century and 
has been routinely subject to peer review.65 
These three cases are not outliers but are the typical response of courts to 
reliability challenges to various forms of FCM evidence.  Avoiding the 
pointed science-based critiques of FCM evidence or the complexity of 
matching feature-comparison methods of forensic science appears to be 
foundational in many judicial decisions on the subject.  Rather than 
addressing the complexity head on and resolving it, courts tend to use a 
variety of analysis-avoiding methods in evaluating the reliability of FCM 
evidence, even after learning of its shortcomings in the NRC report.  For 
example, in Meskimen v. Commonwealth,66 the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
considered a challenge to the reliability of “microscopic hair comparison,” 
where the defendant had argued, pretrial, that hair comparison was 
unreliable.67  Not only did the trial court admit the evidence, but it took 
judicial notice that the hair comparison was scientifically reliable and 
declined to hold a Daubert hearing.68  On appeal, the defendant brought to 
the court’s attention the NRC report on the unreliability of microscopic hair 
comparison.  The court rejected the defendant’s concern, upholding the 
decision about judicial notice of reliability.  In finding no error, the court 
noted that it has a “duty to ensure that method is supported by scientific 
findings, or at least not seriously questioned by recent reputable scientific 
findings, before taking judicial notice of its acceptability.”69  What the court 
failed to address, however, is noteworthy:  the NRC report concluded there 
was “no scientific support for the use of hair comparisons for 
individualization in the absence of nuclear DNA.”70  Despite that conclusion, 
the court held that a Daubert hearing was not required as “[m]icroscopic hair 
 
 62. Id. at 497. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 65. Id. at 274–75 (quoting United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 66. 435 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2013). 
 67. Id. at 530. 
 68. Id. at 535. 
 69. Id. at 535–36.  The court cited the problem of bullet-lead analysis as an example of 
“junk science,” noting the reversal of a conviction involving such evidence. Id. at 536 n.10 
(citing Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006)). 
 70. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 161 (emphasis added). 
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analysis is a scientifically reliable method” that has been admissible in 
Kentucky for many years.71 
Curiously, the court vaguely refers to the NRC report’s critique of hair-
comparison evidence in a footnote and states that “hair analysis has been 
called into question by several recent findings, including those of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.”72  But the court does not mention that the NRC 
report’s conclusion regarding the lack of scientific support for hair 
comparison revealed that 90 percent of the trial transcripts reviewed 
contained erroneous statements about hair comparison—a finding 
corroborated the FBI and the Innocence Project.73  It also failed to mention 
that twenty-six out of twenty-eight agents or analysts provided testimony or 
submitted laboratory reports with erroneous statements.74 
In the first reported case to cite the PCAST report, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois was not swayed by the concerns raised in 
the report and concluded that the shortcomings of fingerprint comparison 
were only questions of weight, not admissibility.75  Any concerns, the court 
stated, could be addressed on cross-examination.76  Likewise, and consistent 
with prior decisions,77 the court declined to limit the expert from providing a 
conclusion about a match or otherwise limiting the opinion of the 
government’s expert.78  Finding that the PCAST report was simply 
“advisory,”79 the court continued along the same, well-worn path. 
III.  MAKING DECISIONS 
To address the problem of judicial resistance to seriously addressing the 
shortcomings of FCM evidence, insights from cognitive science may help to 
explain how judges think. 
A.  Thinking:  Fast or Slow? 
Renowned psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky met in 
1969 and worked together on an almost-daily basis for the next decade and a 
 
 71. Meskimen, 435 S.W.3d at 535. 
 72. Id. at 535 n.9. 
 73. See id.; see also Press Release, FBI, FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis 
Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-
analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review 
[https://perma.cc/MPT8-2NEP]. 
 74. See Press Release, FBI, supra note 73. 
 75. United States v. Myshawn Bonds, No. 15 CR 573-2, 2017 WL 4511061, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 10, 2017). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 78. Myshawn Bonds, 2017 WL 4511061, at *3.  The court also granted the government’s 
request that the defendant not be allowed to cross-examine the analyst about the Brandon 
Mayfield case, in which the FBI wrongly identified Mayfield’s fingerprints indicating his 
involvement in the Madrid train bombing case. Id. at *4. 
 79. Id. at *3 (stating that the court “agrees with the government that the PCAST report 
presents only advisory recommendations concerning validity”). 
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half.80  During that time, they “invented questions and jointly examined 
[their] intuitive answers.”81  Each day yielded multiple questions, and each 
question became a small experiment.82  The goal was not to determine 
whether the intuition was correct but to assume that many intuitive thoughts 
were shared and to demonstrate the effect that these intuitive thoughts had on 
judgments.83  From many decades of work, they developed an exceptionally 
influential theory of cognitive science, which reasons that humans have two 
systems for thinking—fast and slow, also described respectively as “intuitive 
and deliberate thought processes.”84  Kahneman was awarded the Nobel 
Prize for work that followed from their discoveries.85 
“A defining property of intuitive thoughts,” Kahneman wrote in his Nobel 
Prize lecture, “is that they come to mind spontaneously, like percepts.”86  
These types of intuitive decisions, termed “System 1 decisions,”87 are “fast, 
automatic, effortless, associative, and difficult to control or modify.”88  By 
comparison, the decision-making processes termed System II are “slower, 
serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; they are also relatively flexible 
and potentially rule-governed.”89  Kahneman also explains that these 
different systems of decision-making have other defining attributes.  For 
example, System I generates what he terms “impressions of the attributes of 
objects of perception and thought.”90  That is to say, these impressions are 
not voluntary and often not verbally explicit.  By comparison, System II is 
involved in judgments, which are “explicit and intentional.”91 
We all use both systems of making decisions—although some claim these 
two systems are more of a continuum than a binary system.92  The system 
used depends on the nature of the problem presented and possibly on the level 
of expertise the person has in resolving those types of problems.93  But the 
 
 80. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 6 (2011). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See Daniel Kahneman, Nobel Prize Lecture:  Maps of Bounded Rationality:  A 
Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice 449 (Dec. 8, 2002), 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/kahnemann-
lecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9Q-RV2R]. 
 85. Amos Tversky had passed away before the Nobel Prize was awarded. See id. 
 86. Id. at 452. 
 87. Stanovich and West labeled the two systems Type I and Type II. See Keith E. 
Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:  Implications for the 
Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645, 658–59 (2000). 
 88. Kahneman, supra note 84, at 450. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 451. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Laura F. Mega et al., Do Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Rely on Two Distinct 
Neural Systems?  A Case Study in Face Processing, FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, Aug. 
25, 2015, at 1, 2 (noting that, in contrast to the binary system, the “unified approaches propose 
that intuitive and deliberate judgments rely on the same (or similar) rules, while differing only 
along a dimension of consciousness”). 
 93. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 33–35.  “As you become skilled in a task, its demand 
for energy diminishes. . . .  A general ‘law of least effort’ applies to cognitive as well as 
physical exertion.” Id. at 35. 
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use of System II demands more cognitive energy and is more taxing; and, in 
general, we tend to “gravitate to the least demanding course of action.”94  As 
Kahneman points out, based upon his research, “laziness is built deep into 
our nature.”95  Thus, we naturally resort to System I where we can conserve 
cognitive energy for when we need it (such as meeting deadlines when 
completing a law review article).  System I runs automatically and generates 
suggestions for System II, such as “impressions, intuitions, intentions, and 
feelings.”96  As we generally believe our impressions and act on them, 
System II endorses our original sense and turns them into behaviors.97  
However, when there is a problem—as when System I does not offer a ready 
answer (as would occur with a complex math problem)—System II begins to 
take over and offers a surge of conscious attention.98  Thus, when thinking 
about a more complicated problem than System I can manage, System II—
which requires much greater cognition and focus—begins to operate.99 
 Kahneman provides examples of how much effort is required for some 
System II problems.  For example, if you are asked to solve a complicated 
multiplication problem while walking, you will likely stop walking and turn 
your attention to the problem.100  System II is “deliberate, effortful, and 
orderly.”101  When merging onto the highway, you generally stop talking or 
may even turn the radio down.  System II is an energy-dependent process.  
While System II thinking engages in highly diverse forms of operations 
related to thought, it is also regulating self-control, another reason it is energy 
consumptive.102  Notably, however, System II is able to “hold and compare 
two opposite arguments in the working memory,” while System I does not 
even admit to the existence of an alternative.103 
We generate intuitive ideas while taking a long drive on an uncrowded 
road, or when walking a few miles without any real effort:  “a stroll,” as 
Kahneman says.104  We conjure up article ideas and book concepts easily, 
without much effort.  These ideas present themselves to us effortlessly and 
spontaneously.  Working through those ideas on the written page, however, 
is much more complicated and laborious, as anyone who writes knows.  But 
those of us who write also know that some problems are simple to resolve in 
writing, while some are more akin to a mathematical proof. 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 24. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 39–40. 
 101. Id. at 20. 
 102. Diana Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch:  Intuition (and Some Emotion) in 
Judicial Decision-Making 2 (2016) [hereinafter Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch] 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009883 
[https://perma.cc/M6FE-XPYF].  This manuscript was subsequently published. See generally 
Diana Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch—Intuition and Experience in Judicial Decision-
Making, 102 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS & SOZIALPHILOSPHIE 245 (2016). 
 103. Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch, supra note 102 (manuscript at 2). 
 104. KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 39–40. 
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When judges make legal decisions, are they using System I, System II, or 
both?  If they are in the courtroom making snap decisions, we assume they 
will primarily be using System I.  If they are writing opinions, we might 
assume it is always System II.  And yet, there may be more complexity to the 
question in determining which system is at play. 
Assume a lawyer asks a witness, “What did you say to the plaintiff at the 
scene of the accident?”  The opposing lawyer stands up and says “objection, 
hearsay!”  The judge—like all lawyers schooled in evidence—quickly and 
intuitively recognizes that an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted is hearsay.105  Given that the judge has become an expert 
in matters of evidence due to longstanding practice with the subject,106 this 
recognition is likely made nearly instantly and with little effort.  It is, in short, 
a paradigmatic System I process—quick, intuitive, and effortless. 
The more difficult question to answer here is what happens when the 
opposing lawyer provides a complex explanation for why the testimony 
should be admissible as a hearsay exception.  For example, assume the lawyer 
argues the testimony is a prior consistent statement that occurred before a 
motive to fabricate arose and after the suggestion of fabrication had been 
leveled at the witness.107  Now the judge will likely have to stop, look at the 
language of the rule, hear arguments from each side about when the statement 
occurred and when the alleged motive to fabricate arose, and then a careful 
judge will consult more authority to properly resolve the issue.  The process 
has become more effortful, more likely a System II problem at this point.  
There is not an intuitive answer available, given the complexity of the hearsay 
exception at issue. 
Judges make decisions all day and must categorize many issues as System 
I problems or they would simply not have the cognitive energy left to tackle 
all the questions they must resolve.  System II decisions are energy 
draining.108  President Obama noted this precise problem of decision fatigue 
 
 105. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a statement that:  (1) the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”). 
 106. Expertise in an area allows more complex thoughts to become more automatic, System 
I decisions. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 80, at 35. 
 107. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).  Rule 801(d) provides: 
Statements That Are Not Hearsay.  A statement that meets the following conditions 
is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies and is subject 
to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
. . . . 
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered:  
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently 
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so 
testifying . . . [.] 
Id.  For proof of the complexity of applying Rule 801(d)(1)(B), see generally Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick & Christopher B. Mueller, Prior Consistent Statements:  The Dangers of 
Misinterpreting Recently Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 84 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. ARGUENDO 192 (2016). 
 108. See Richards, When Judges Have a Hunch, supra note 102 (manuscript at 2). 
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when he famously said that he wore only gray or blue suits to try to “pare 
down decisions” because he had too many other decisions to make.109  “You 
need to focus your decision-making energy.  You need to routinize 
yourself.”110 
Likewise, judges must apply System I thinking to avoid decision 
fatigue.111  For example, in writing opinions, much of the rote citations to 
subjects such as standard of review, jurisdiction, and precedents on point, are 
likely to be System I decisions—automatic and effortless.  Judges try not to 
reinvent the wheel on every summary judgment decision in which they 
explain the framework for making that decision.  And for admissibility 
questions presented to the court that have been decided in a consistent way 
by that court and its sister courts, the pressure to consider the issue as an easy 
problem that can be answered safely by reference to those court decisions 
would likely be strong. 
By comparison, Daubert hearings are notorious for being time and effort 
intensive.  A typical Daubert hearing and opinion would seem to rest fully in 
System II thought, given the complexity of the subject and the need to “hold 
and compare two opposite arguments” in the working memory.112  Unless, 
of course, the problem is perceived as simple, at which point System I might 
essentially hijack the cognitive process and the court might simply apply 
precedent or look to the decisions of sister courts. 
The unconscious draw to rely on System I thinking to resolve FCM 
evidence issues without a deep explanation of the Daubert factors might be 
strong, particularly when there are troubling problems with the evidence that 
might result in an unpopular opinion to exclude or substantially limit its 
admissibility.113  During the conference at Boston College Law School that 
 
 109. Michael Lewis, Obama’s Way, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2012), https://www.vanityfair.com/ 
news/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama [https://perma.cc/VG9A-N28U]. 
 110. Id.  In addition to making decisions about legal questions, judges have a great deal of 
case management responsibilities that incentivize them to find ways to clear their dockets, 
which creates additional pressures to decide matters expediently. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt 
et al., Multiple Constraint Satisfaction in Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION 
MAKING 27, 31 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010). 
 111. Whether judges employ System I or System II, of course, may depend on the level of 
effort they believe supports their needs, differentiating between easy cases and those that 
require more scrutiny. See Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior:  Expanding 
the Scope of the Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 110, 
at 3, 18–21 (discussing how intermediate courts use central staff law clerks to handle the 
perceived easier cases and how judges give “more limited scrutiny to cases that they 
characterize as easy”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. The clearest example of an unpopular decision about forensic science is the original 
opinion in United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.), 
vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  In Llera Plaza I, Judge Louis Pollak held that 
the government had failed to scientifically demonstrate that a latent fingerprint originated from 
a particular individual. Id. at 518.  He concluded that the examiner would be permitted to 
testify only about points of similarity between the known and latent prints but could not give 
an opinion that the latent print came from a particular person. Id.; see also United States v. 
Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (describing the ruling 
in Llera Plaza I).  After an outcry from the FBI and the DOJ, the court permitted a 
supplemental evidentiary hearing and changed its position and held that the testimony met the 
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gave rise to this symposium, one federal district court judge described the 
substantial time committed to both Daubert hearings and opinions in civil 
cases.114  Other speakers—generally from the plaintiffs’ bar—discussed how 
such Daubert hearings are incredibly time-intensive and expensive.  
According to the speakers, virtually every federal civil case involved a 
defense challenge to the plaintiff’s expert testimony.  Judges must make 
fairly quick decisions about what legal questions merit their deep attention 
and which questions can be handled quickly.  Unfortunately but fairly clearly, 
judges have relegated FCM to the latter category. 
B.  Framing the Issue:  Gains or Losses; Simple or Complex? 
Decisions about which types of issues are effort-intensive and which are 
less complex may follow from how the court, or the parties, frame the issue.  
As cognitive scientists explain, how we frame an issue affects the choices we 
make—known as “framing effects.”115  Framing has been described as “the 
tendency to treat gains differently from losses.”116  In their 1981 article, “The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Tversky and 
Kahneman explain the term “decision frame” as one that refers to “the 
decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice.”117  This chosen frame is partly guided 
by the problem itself and partly by the “norms, habits, and personal 
characteristics of the decision-maker.”118  In addition, even small and 
seemingly unimportant changes in the formulation of the problem can cause 
significant shifts of preference.119 
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s paper was published, studies have proven 
that how a problem is framed can significantly influence the choices people 
make when evaluating risk.120  For example, assume a hypothetical criminal 
case with critical microscopic hair-comparison evidence framed in two ways.  
In the first way, fact finders are told that 97 percent of all hair comparisons 
performed using a comparison microscope are accurate for a 100-day period 
in which roughly twenty comparisons a day are performed.  Fact finders 
would likely determine that the hair comparison in the instant case is 
accurate—focusing on the 97 percent accuracy rate.  By comparison, if fact 
finders are told that in this same 100-day period, sixty faulty comparisons 
 
Daubert requirements. Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 522, 576; see also D.H. Kaye, The 
Nonscience of Fingerprinting:  United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073, 
1073 (2003) (discussing the reaction to the Llera Plaza I decision). 
 114. This point was made by the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chief Judge of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts. Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, 
and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1463, 1535 (2018) (statement of Hon. Patti B. Saris). 
 115. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky 
eds., 2000). 
 116. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts:  Ignorance or Adaptation?, 
79 OR. L. REV. 61, 98 (2000). 
 117. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 457. 
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occurred—approximately one error every three days—the fact finders might 
well find the error rate more meaningful in evaluating the facts of the case.  
The data, of course, are the same, but the framing of the problem influences 
how fact finders would evaluate the risk of error in the given case. 
Additionally, how the litigants present the evidence might well affect how 
the court ultimately frames the issue.  If prosecutors tell the court that “this 
evidence has been admitted in virtually all courts for decades and has 
properly formed the basis of many convictions,” a judge may immediately 
frame the admissibility of the evidence as an easy problem in which many 
other courts have found no reason to exclude it.  An example of the lure of 
System I thinking can be found in the language of John, in which the Fifth 
Circuit declined to even hold a Daubert hearing, instead invoking history and 
disregarding the concerns about the reliability of the evidence:  “Fingerprint 
identification has been admissible as reliable evidence . . . since at least 
1911.”121  Courts frame the FCM evidence question as a historical problem 
and one that many others judges have already solved.  Thus, the choice to 
part from history and the decisions of sister courts would seem to be the far 
riskier decisions and the one to be avoided.  As humans treat potential gains 
differently from loss, the safer decision is to admit the evidence. 
Additional research explains how framing a problem as simple or complex 
affects whether we employ System I or II decision-making and the 
concomitant likelihood of error.  In the classic bat-and-ball problem,122 
subjects are told that a bat and ball together cost $1.10 and that the bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball and finally are asked how much the ball costs.  Most 
people immediately answer “ten cents.”  The answer seems obvious but, after 
doing the math, it is clearly wrong.  The ball costs five cents and the bat costs 
one dollar more:  $1.05.  But for most people, the “ten cent” answer felt 
correct.  It had an intuitive, quick appeal to it that many smart people assumed 
was correct—but it was wrong.  By framing the problem as simple, the 
decision-maker determined the answer quickly, intuitively, and incorrectly. 
Most people assume they would not be fooled by what appears to be the 
correct answer but, indeed, they are fooled.  Studies at a variety of institutions 
show that most people make the error and are unable to suppress the intuitive 
answer that comes to mind.123  Some have wondered whether judges are also 
subject to making errors by relying on intuitive answers.  One could 
hypothesize that judges, who make multiple serious decisions on a daily 
 
 121. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 122. See Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 
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descriptions); Jonah Lehrer, Why Smart People Are Stupid, NEW YORKER (June 12, 2012), 
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[https://perma.cc/6H9W-28CQ].  
 123. See Guthrie et al., supra note 122, at 11. 
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basis, are not so prey to the shortcomings of intuition, given that they are 
“experts” at decision-making.124 
C.  Judges Making Decisions 
How judges make decisions and what factors affect those processes have 
been the subject of much literature over the last several decades.125  More 
recently, many scholars have focused on the role that psychological factors 
may have on judicial decision-making.126  Professors Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey 
J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich have conducted empirical 
examinations designed to determine how judges make decisions.127  In one 
study, they tested intuitive versus deliberative decision-making, employing 
the bat-and-ball problem as well as two other cognitive-reflection tests 
(CRTs), to see if judges made decisions in a fashion that differed from 
others.128  When answering the bat-and-ball problem,129 approximately 28 
percent answered the question correctly.130  As the questions progressed and 
became more difficult, the accuracy percentage of the answers improved to 
between 44 percent and 50 percent.131  These numbers, the authors note, are 
consistent with test-taking students from universities where the original 
CRTs were run; slightly better than those at the University of Michigan, and 
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slightly lower than those at Harvard.132  When all three questions were 
combined and analyzed, there was no statistically significant difference 
between male and female, experienced and inexperienced, and Democrat and 
Republican judges.133  Collectively, the authors note, although “roughly one-
seventh of the judges answered all three [questions] deliberatively,” many 
were able to answer at least one of the problems deliberatively.134  As a 
group, however, judges leaned toward intuitive rather than deliberative 
problem-solving.135  Of course, a three-question CRT is not the same as what 
judges do on the bench, a point noted by the authors.136  But it does provide 
some insight into how judges think.  And as it turns out, they think pretty 
much like everyone else:  when judges perceive a problem to be simple, they 
revert to intuitive decision-making.137 
As Kahneman and others have learned, there are serious concerns about 
intuitive decision-making that arise from the use of heuristics and the 
subsequent likelihood of cognitive biases.  These problems are likely to affect 
judges making decisions. 
When framing a problem as simple, one tends to unknowingly rely on 
intuitive decision-making, a form of thinking that is prone to using heuristics.  
Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts used to solve a problem, or what Kahneman 
defined as “a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often 
imperfect, answers to difficult questions.”138  Reliance upon heuristics, 
however, can lead to systematic biases.139  Cognitive biases, which are 
understood as consistent errors or fallacies, are ones to which we all fall prey, 
even when we try to guard against them.140  There are multiple forms of 
cognitive bias with names that explain the nature of the bias:  confirmation 
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bias,141 hindsight bias,142 belief perseverance,143 groupthink,144 and the 
sunk-cost fallacy.145  Many of these biases are relevant to judicial decisions 
about FCM evidence and may explain the judicial resistance to taking 
reliability concerns seriously. 
Some of these biases are exhibited in the cases.  As proof of confirmation 
bias, the courts continue to seek out information that confirms their existing 
beliefs that FCM evidence should be admissible:  looking to prior cases (even 
ones that predate the NRC report or the Daubert and Rule 702 reliability 
requirements) and findings ways to avoid the serious concerns raised in the 
NRC report about the shortcomings of the evidence.  At the same time, they 
avoid anything that would challenge their existing belief, such as the strong 
association between faulty forensics and wrongful conviction.  For example, 
the court in Meskimen admitted microscopic hair testimony—noting its long 
history of admission—and omitted the concern of the NRC report that 
counsels against it due to overwhelming proof that such evidence is 
flawed.146  The court looked at the NRC report but only saw what confirmed 
its own opinion.147 
Likewise, the role that belief perseverance has in these decisions is also 
strong:  the constant references to history and the repeated references to 
remaining faithful to tradition despite the serious concerns about reliability 
raised in the NRC report are all indicative of the “tendency to maintain 
existing beliefs in the face of evidence that ought to weaken or even totally 
reverse those beliefs.”148  The “groupthink” problem is also prevalent in the 
decisions where courts repeatedly refer to sister courts to confirm that all in 
the group are thinking alike. 
All in all, the opinions admitting FCM evidence without limitation or 
concern seem to follow the same, worn formula of treating the problem of 
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FCM evidence as an easy issue, which results in the use of heuristics with 
their attendant cognitive biases.  The pressing concern is whether there is any 
hope for change. 
CONCLUSION 
Sadly, it seems unlikely that a sea change will occur in the way courts 
approach FCM evidence.  In the decade following the NRC report, the cases 
suggest that courts are simply intractable in their approach to admitting the 
evidence.  Prosecutors have continued to argue, both in court and to the 
media, that forensic science is reliable and that both the NRC report and 
PCAST report are irrelevant.149  Convincing courts otherwise seems to be 
nearly impossible.  Courts have categorized FCM evidence admissibility as 
a simple problem and have avoided addressing the serious questions about its 
reliability. 
There is a potential for change, however, with a change to Rule 702 that 
requires the judiciary to pay closer attention to the requirements of reliability.  
The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee’s notes, mentioned 
above, suggest a first step.  The notes describe testing as “whether the 
expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the 
expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is 
instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be 
assessed for reliability.”150  If Rule 702 embraced that requirement of 
objective proof, rather than a “subjective, conclusory approach,” it might 
help the courts to move toward a better method of gatekeeping with respect 
to FCM evidence.  This potential for change, however, will not be realized 
until courts recognize that matching a known and an unknown sample is a 
very complicated endeavor. 
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